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Abstract
Emerging policies worldwide require biodiversity gains as compensation for
losses associated with economic development, seeking to achieve “no net loss”
(NNL). Multipliers – factors by which gains are larger than associated losses –
can be crucial for true NNL. Here, we review the theoretical literature on
multipliers. Then, we collate data on multipliers implemented in practice, rep-
resenting the most complete such assessment to date. Finally, we explore re-
maining design gaps relating to social, ethical, and governance considerations.
Multiplier values should theoretically be tens or hundreds when considering,
for example, ecological uncertainties. We propose even larger multipliers re-
quired to satisfy previously ignored considerations – including prospect the-
ory, taboo trades, and power relationships. Conversely, our data analyses show
that multipliers are smaller in practice, regularly <10.0, and have not changed
significantly in magnitude over time.
We recommend that NNL policymakers provide explicit multiplier guidelines,
require larger multipliers where appropriate, and ensure transparent reporting
of multipliers used. Further research is necessary to determine reasons for the
implementation gap we have identified. At the same time, there is a need to
explore when and where the social, ethical, and governance requirements for
NNL reviewed here can be met through approaches other than multipliers.
Introduction
Economic development delivers societal benefits, but
also incurs costs through negative biodiversity impacts.
A balance must be found between development and
biodiversity conservation. The “no net loss” (NNL) policy
principle could help achieve this balance. NNL policies are
those under which developers – having mitigated biodi-
versity impacts where possible – fully offset residual losses
through quantified, commensurate gains (Gardner et al.
2013). When losses and gains are summed, development
then theoretically results in NNL of biodiversity, against
some reference point (Bull, Gordon et al. 2014). NNL
biodiversity policies have existed since at least the 1970s
and continue to emerge (Maron et al. 2016), with an
expanding associated technical literature (Calvet et al.
2015).
An important component of NNL policy is determining
the ecological gains required to deliver full compensation
for residual losses. Doing so involves choosing, for in-
stance: biodiversity value metrics; counterfactuals against
which net outcomes are evaluated; and, exchange rules
between biodiversity components (Que´tier & Lavorel
2012; Bull et al. 2013; Bull, Milner-Gulland et al. 2014;
Gibbons et al. 2015). Among such considerations is
whether to require “multipliers” – i.e., factors by which
gains are larger than losses (Bull et al. 2013). While
drivers motivating multiplier use and methods for their
calculation have been discussed (e.g., Laitila et al. 2014;
Pilgrim & Ekstrom 2014), there is no global assessment of
multipliers used in practice. Consequently, it is difficult to
assess whether multipliers are being used appropriately.
More generally, NNL research often focuses upon tech-
nical challenges, with insufficient treatment of social and
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ethical concerns. This is problematic when NNL policies
are sometimes deemed unethical (Ives & Bekessy 2015).
Here, we review the relevant literature, then collate
and analyze data on multipliers used in practice, dis-
cussing whether implementation corresponds with the-
oretical requirements. Subsequently, we review gaps in
multiplier design related to social and ethical considera-
tions. We finish with policy recommendations related to
multipliers and NNL more broadly.
Multipliers in theory
Reasons for using multipliers
Multipliers are employed for multiple reasons (Table 1),
including: (I) to achieve broader biodiversity conserva-
tion objectives (Brownlie & Botha 2012); (II) to over-
come poor information or predictive capability (Moilanen
et al. 2009); (III) to manage risks of complete failure for
biodiversity offsets (Maron et al. 2012); (IV) to account
for temporal issues (Overton et al. 2012); and (V) to ac-
count for imperfect exchange currencies (McKenney &
Kiesecker 2010).
Pilgrim & Ekstrom (2014) propose that categories I,
II, and IV represent appropriate motivations for multi-
plier use, whereas categories III and V merely mask in-
adequate biodiversity offset design. Others warn against
resorting to multipliers when: there is no ecological jus-
tification; insufficiently accounting for temporary biodi-
versity losses; and when offset activities might fail due to
ecological correlation (Moilanen et al. 2009; Gardner et al.
2013). Multipliers are often but not always associated, to
some degree, with managing uncertainties.
Maron et al. (2016) explore unresolved controversies
in NNL policies, grouping considerations into technical,
social, ethical, and governance issues. Referring to this
framework, alongside Table 1, multipliers currently man-
age a combination of: technical challenges (categories II,
III, V); social challenges (categories III, IV); and gover-
nance challenges (categories I, III). They are not yet de-
signed to incorporate ethical considerations, which we
discuss later.
Use of multipliers
The Sydney Olympic Park development provides an
illustrative case study (Pickett et al. 2013). Lost pond
habitat for a threatened frog species was offset by cre-
ating new ponds nearby. Subsequent monitoring over a
decade found that guaranteeing NNL for frog populations
required new ponds 19 times larger by area than those
removed. Pickett et al. suggest this multiplier (= 19) was
necessitated by time lags (category IV), habitat quality
being insufficiently captured in project metrics (cate-
gory V), and frog populations not always establishing
(category III). Multipliers in this case appear to have
been useful in meeting NNL objectives (maintaining frog
populations), despite category III and V multipliers being
cautioned against by Pilgrim & Ekstrom (2014) – perhaps
due to lack of correlated restoration failure between
ponds (Moilanen et al. 2009).
Sydney Olympic Park aside, there has been little explo-
ration concerning multipliers implemented in practice.
Some provide examples of proposed multipliers (McKen-
ney & Kiesecker 2010; Que´tier & Lavorel 2012; Laitila
et al. 2014), without assessing multipliers realized under
these policies. Substantive regional research was under-
taken by Quigley & Harper (2006; Canadian Fish Habi-
tat) and Matthews & Endress (2008; US Wetland Bank-
ing). A lack of specific multipliers has been recorded for
Germany, New Zealand, and Sweden (Darbi & Tausch
2010; Persson 2013; Brown et al. 2014;). No global as-
sessment exists regarding the actual use of multipliers in
NNL policies (by which we mean guidelines for achiev-
ing NNL commitments) or projects (by which we mean
specific development sites attempting to achieve NNL) –
a gap we address in the “Multipliers in Practice” section.
Conversely, there is considerable theoretical literature on
multiplier design.
Theoretical literature on multipliers
A key theoretical work deriving biodiversity offset mul-
tipliers (Moilanen et al. 2009) incorporated consideration
of uncertainty in: magnitude and value of realized biodi-
versity losses and gains; spatial correlation of restoration
outcomes; and discount rates, i.e., time preferences.
Moilanen et al. proposed a bet-hedging strategy across
multiple sites, aligned with general recommendations
to manage risk in conservation through diversification
(Hummel et al. 2009).
Subsequently, Overton et al. (2012) further incorpo-
rated time preferences into multipliers, addressing: the
chance that offset gains never occurs; lost option value as-
sociated with biodiversity; and, conversely, potential eco-
nomic returns received from biodiversity (i.e., ecosystem
services). Notably, the authors state that they do not ad-
dress “social problems behind the effectiveness of offsets,”
without defining social problems.
Laitila et al. (2014) extended the theory on appropri-
ate multipliers, combining the preceding literature to de-
velop “minimum practical multipliers.” They note the
connection between risk and time preferences (“discount
rate can also model the offsetting risk, as an immediate
certain gain may be preferable to a risky delayed gain”).
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Table 1 Rationale and drivers for using multipliers in practice (Pilgrim & Ekstrom 2014), alongside related categories of uncertainty
Category Reason Description
Example
regulatory
framework
Relevant
uncertainties
I Achieving biodiversity
objectives
Multipliers designed to ensure compensation meets
landscape level conservation objectives. When
development causes cumulative impacts, or to
leverage conservation funding (e.g., higher multipliers
for more threatened habitats, or to achieve net gains).
South Africa;
New Zealand
Human decision
II Limited information, or
predictive power
Multipliers used to ensure NNL is achieved by accounting
for epistemic uncertainties. When there is limited
information on either impacts or offsets (e.g.,
development disturbing species movements), or
predictions are uncertain (e.g., response of habitat to
management).
Australia; UK Epistemic
III Risk of failure Multipliers used if conservation gains might not succeed.
When ecological measures implemented under NNL to
achieve biodiversity gains may not be successful (e.g.,
restoration measures might fail, a reintroduced species
might not establish) or other factors might prevent
offsets (e.g., commercial viability, changing legislation).
Canada; US Epistemic
IV Temporal issues Multipliers used to manage temporal challenges. When
future biodiversity gains may need to be larger than
realized current losses in order to account for:
 Human time preferences (e.g., incorporate discount
rates)
 Time lags between impacts and gains
 The degree of permanence that can be assured for
offsets.
UK Human decision
V Inexact NNL trading Multipliers used by regulators to ensure ecological
equivalence when NNL metrics do not. So, when policy
is based upon imperfect currencies (e.g., those that are
nonreflective of broader biodiversity or functionality),
or exchanges based entirely on expert opinion (i.e.,
rather than purely quantitative measures).
Germany Linguistic; human
decision
Moilanen & Laitila (2016) argue for an additional mul-
tiplier to manage leakage (i.e., when “environmentally
damaging activity stopped by avoided loss offsetting . . . is
not really stopped but relocates elsewhere”). The addi-
tional factor would be = 1/(1 – L), where L = the propor-
tion of activities displaced (e.g., leakage of 90% of such
activities could necessitate an additional multiplier = 10).
The existing literature on multipliers focuses upon
technical considerations, also incorporating time prefer-
ences and leakage (social and governance considerations,
respectively). All considerations relate to categories pro-
posed by Pilgrim & Ekstrom (2014; Table 1). Multiplier
values consequently considered necessary for NNL, in
theory, are in the order of unity to hundreds (Laitila et al.
2014). More recently, however, Gibbons et al. (2015) pro-
pose that realized multipliers will likely be 10.0 for de-
velopment projects seeking NNL, due to “operational fea-
sibility.” How large, then, are multipliers used in practice?
Multipliers in practice
Methodology
Our approach was simple, yet labor-intensive – we
systematically collated all accessible information on
multipliers used in practice. An assumption was that NNL
projects are primarily enabled through three policy types:
(1) government policies; (2) project cofinance; and (3)
corporate commitments. We explored all NNL guidelines
arising from these policies, and projects implemented
accordingly. The following resources were used: (1) a
global policy database (Maron et al. 2016); (2) key lenders
requiring NNL (ICMM & IUCN 2012); and (3) corporate
NNL-type commitments (Rainey et al. 2014). Every coun-
try, organization, and corporation mentioned in these
resources was within scope, and no information could
be found on multipliers for those not included in the
Results.
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Information sources
The literature on each NNL policy was searched (Google,
Google Scholar) for papers reporting multipliers specified
in guidelines or in practice. Search terms were “multi-
plier” and “ratio,” combined with “biodiversity offset,”
“biodiversity compensation,” “compensatory mitigation,”
and “NNL.”
For Australia Capital Territory and New South Wales
(Australia), data on the area of development and accom-
panying offsets were obtained with the relevant multipli-
ers not specified. We calculated the effective multiplier
in each state as the mean offset:development ratio by
area for all projects, reporting the standard deviation. Al-
though good practice NNL requires compound metrics,
e.g., combining area and habitat condition (Que´tier &
Lavorel 2012), this simplification provides the best mul-
tiplier estimate given available data. The multiplier was
similarly calculated for three individual projects where
explicit values were not found (San Francisco-Mocoa
Road, Ambatovy, Etileno Petrochemical), and this limita-
tion should be considered when interpreting the results.
Where no online information was available regard-
ing known policies or projects, experts were contacted
for clarification (“experts” being researchers publishing
related literature, or practitioners developing projects),
and listed in Figure S1. Details on specific sources for all
reported data are included in Figure S1.
Information collected
We primarily sought numerical values for multipliers
specified by any policy or project. Beyond this, to under-
stand comparability, we subcategorized multipliers. First,
we divided multipliers into “proposed” (specified, but not
implemented in practice) and “realized” (implemented).
Second, we categorized multipliers specified by national
policy, and by individual development projects. Finally,
we categorized multipliers based upon motivation for use
(Table 1). In addition, we considered whether multipliers
have changed in magnitude over time. Multipliers were
dated to the year in which enabling regulations were put
in place, the necessary policy interpretation published, or
project details published.
Results
Absolute size
Quigley & Harper (2006; Canadian Fish Habitat) found
that multipliers required by regulators were 6.8:1 and
realized multipliers were 1.5:1, or 1.2:1 and 0.8:1 (in-
channel and riparian habitat, respectively). Matthews
& Endress (2008; US Wetlands, Illinois) found that
proposed multipliers were 1.55, and realized multipliers
1.1 (22 of 37 projects studied). Pickett et al. (2013) report
a multiplier of 19 at the Sydney Olympic Park. Some
information on proposed multipliers is available through
public policy documentation and gray literature. No
online data sets explicitly quantify multipliers used on
projects (Figure S1). Few multiplier values are obtainable
for offsets implemented through cofinance agreements
or corporate commitments.
The majority of proposed multipliers are >1.0 but
<10.0 (Table 2; Figure 1), the maximum is 90 (certain
UK habitats; Defra 2011). Realized multipliers are gen-
erally at the lower end of the range proposed by pol-
icy. There is little difference in absolute magnitude be-
tween multipliers proposed through policies or projects
(Figure 1). The largest realized multiplier for an individ-
ual project = 30.0 (Shaw’s Pass, South Africa; Jenner
& Balmforth 2015). Some countries with NNL policies
do not specifically require multipliers, in which case we
assume the multiplier realized in practice by developers
= 1.0 (Table 2). This assumption could skew the results
downward – however, national studies available for New
Zealand and Sweden show the assumption to be valid
(i.e., an effective multiplier 1.0 was implemented when
none was specified in policy; Persson 2013; Brown et al.
2014). Where policy noted the need for multipliers but
values were left to expert opinion, the multiplier could
not be assumed to be = 1.0 (Germany).
Comparability
Since multipliers are employed to address different NNL
challenges, those collected here are not directly compa-
rable (Tables 1 and 2). Most can be classified under more
than one motivational category (Table 2), although South
Africa exemplifies category I, and proposed multipliers
in the United Kingdom explicitly reflect categories II–
IV. Our aim was not to compare multipliers directly, but
rather capture absolute multiplier values used, and dis-
cuss drivers. Nonetheless, the fact that multipliers are of-
ten motivated by more than one driver, and so may be
incomparable, deserves attention.
Multipliers through time
We plotted absolute size of proposed multipliers against
the year in which the associated policy or project be-
gan, finding no statistically significant trend. While the
lower bound of proposed multipliers remained constant
at 1.0, the upper bound of proposed multipliers trended
slightly upward (Figure 2a). The scientific literature on
appropriate design of offsets has grown substantially since
the early 2000s (Calvet et al. 2015), reflected in more de-
tailed multiplier requirements under recent offset policies
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Table 2 multipliers proposed and realized as part of offsetting under NNL policies and projects
Category Country (Region)
Multiplier
Proposed
Multiplier
Realized Source
Category
(see Table 1) Year
Required by policies or
guidelines at a regional
or national level
Australia (Australian
Capital Territory)
1.0–10.0 2.9 ± 1.2 ACT (2015) I–III 2007
Australia (Victoria) 1.0–2.0 – DSE (2002) I–III 2002
Australia (Queensland) 1.0–10.0 – NELA (2014) I–III 2008
Australia Koala Habitat
(Queensland)
>5.0 – EcosystemMarketplace (2010) I–III 2006
Australia (South Australia) 1.0–10.0 <10.0 Gibbons et al. (2015) I–III 2003
Australia (West Australia) 1.0–10.0 2.8 ± 5.6 WA (2015) I–III 2006
Brazil 1.0 1.0–4.0 Villarroya et al. (2014); Sonter et al.
(2014)
– 1965
Canada (In-channel HADD) 6.8 1.5 Quigley & Harper (2006) I, II 1986
Canada (Riparian HADD) 1.2 0.8 Quigley & Harper (2006) I, II 1986
Canada (South East
Alberta Pilot)
3.0–5.0 – Noga (2014) II, V 2013
Canada (British Columbia) – 0.78 Carter et al. (2012) I, II 2012
China >1.0 – EcosystemMarketplace (2010) – 2002
Columbia 1.0 – Villarroya et al. (2014) – 1994
Denmark 1.0 – Expert (Figure S1) – 1979
France 1.0–5.0 – Morandeau & Vilaysack (2012) I, III 2007
Germany Not specified Expert opinion Darbi & Tausch (2010) V 1976
Mexico 1.0 – Villarroya et al. (2014) – 1989
New Zealand 1.0 Not measured Brown et al. (2014) – 1987
Peru 1.0; 3.0–5.0 – Villarroya et al. (2014); Pilla (2014) –; ? 2013
South Africa 5.0–30.0 0.5–30.0 Laitila et al. (2014); Expert (Figure S1) I 2007
Sweden 1.0 1.0 Persson (2013) – 1995
UK Biodiversity Offset Pilot 1.2–90.0 – Defra (2011) II–IV 2012
US (Wetland Banking) 1.0–10.0 – Laitila et al. (2014) II–IV 1983
US (Wetland Banking,
Illinois only)
1.55 1.1 Matthews & Endress (2008) II–IV 1983
Category
Country
(Project)
Multiplier
proposed
Multiplier
realized Source
Category
(see Table 1) Year
Specific development
projects subject to
NNL policy
Australia (Sydney Olympic Park) 0.7–19.3 19.0 Pickett et al. (2013) III, IV, V 2009
Australia (Whitehaven Coal Mine) 4.46–8.50 – Gibbons et al. (2015) I–III 2010
Canada (Trans Mountain Legacy
Fund)
1.0 Not measured Bull & Sandom (2016) – 2004
Canada (Pipestone Creek Habitat
Bank)
– 10.0 Hunt et al. (2011) ? 1986
Columbia (San Francisco-Mocoa
road)
– 1.65 Vicetini et al. (2009) ? 2009
France (CNM Railway) 1.0 – Aiama et al. (2015) – 2007
France (Bay of Brest) 4.0 – Laitila et al. (2014) II, III 2007
Guyana (Guyana Goldfields) – 2.4 Expert (Figure S1) I, II 2013
Madagascar (Ambatovy) 1.2–3.5 – von Hase et al. (2014) ? 2012
Madagascar (QMM) 2.0–4.0 – Temple et al. (2012) II, IV 2012
Mexico (Etileno Petrochemical) 0.22 – Braskem-Idesa (2011) ? 2011
Mongolia (Oyu Tolgoi) 0.3–4.0 – TBC & FFI (2012) ν II, IV 2012
South Africa (Shaw’s Pass) – 30.0 Jenner & Balmforth (2015) I 2007
Sweden (Umea˚ Railway) >1.0 – Project documentation – 1995
Switzerland (Dry Grasslands) 1.5–8.0 – Laitila et al. (2014) II 1979
UK (Streatham Common,
Thameslink)
1.2–90.0 2.0 Baker (2013) II–IV 2012
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Figure 1 Magnitude of proposed and realized multipliers (y-axis), for a set of policies and projects. Black dots = proposed multipliers, where error bars
represent possible range. Triangles = realized multipliers. Solid gray line = maximum multiplier that is operationally feasible (10) according to Gibbons
et al. (2015). Dashed gray line = approximate minimum multiplier (15) according to Laitila et al. (2014), for a 30-year restoration lag and a 10% discount
rate (see Overton et al. 2012).
(e.g., United Kingdom) and projects (e.g., Oyu Tolgoi).
Even if our analysis of multiplier values through time
shows no significant increase as of yet, we consider it
likely that multiplier values will increase in the future as
research findings are built into NNL projects and policies.
All categories (I–V) have motivated multiplier use since
the 1980s (Figure 2b). We have insufficient data to show
whether trends exist in these categories over time, but
the data do show that all previously categorized drivers
for using multipliers have existed for as long as modern
NNL policies themselves.
Discussion of data analyses
The paucity of information on implemented multipliers
suggests they are often not reported, or used at all. For
some policies – Australia, Canada, South Africa, the
United States – both proposed and realized multiplier
estimates exist. These four cases are loosely comparable,
being based upon numerous sites arising from regulatory
policy. For these mature NNL policies, realized multipli-
ers are smaller than policymakers propose, but generally
>1.0. Regarding these four policies and some others (Ger-
many, New Zealand, Sweden), certain considerations
associated with multipliers are satisfied through different
elements of NNL policy. So, Australia has a defensible
metric, while Canada, South Africa and the United States
require flexible but robust quantification of losses and
gains (see category V). Australia, Germany, and South
Africa require consideration of landscape context, and/or
proximity between development and offsets – partly
addressing broader objectives (category I). Germany and
the United States enable habitat banking, realizing gains
in advance of losses – partially removing the need to
account for restoration failure or time lags (categories
III, IV). Conversely, UK policy suggests multipliers to
account for numerous considerations (categories II–IV).
Regarding projects – Ambatovy, QMM, and Oyu Tolgoi
all belong to the global mining group Rio Tinto, which
has a “Net Positive Impact” corporate policy (Rainey et al.
2014), and are arguably comparable. All three projects
use detailed metrics and counterfactuals, obviating the
need for related multipliers. The Whitehaven Coal Mine,
Guyana Goldfields, and Etileno Petrochemical projects
are similar (i.e., large extractive projects seeking “NNL
or better”) – all propose effective multipliers <10.0.
The projects implemented in Australia, Canada, France,
South Africa, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are
associated with the NNL policies for those same countries
listed in Table 2, so links exist between policy and project
multipliers reported here. Information is publically
accessible for these specific projects, suggesting ecological
compensation is perhaps more extensive than on average
for such projects. Sydney Olympic Park is the only
project subjected to peer-reviewed analysis following
implementation.
Gaps in multiplier design
Our analyses suggest that realized multipliers are moti-
vated by various drivers (Tables 1 and 2), but are not
large enough to meet theoretical requirements (Figure 1).
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Figure 2 (A) Size of proposed multiplier against the year in which the relevant policy was developed. Black dots = lower bound of proposed multiplier
(with solid line of linear best fit, R2 > 0.1), squares = upper bound of proposed multiplier (with dashed line of linear best fit R2  0.1). Where there is
a single number specified, the upper and lower bounds are the same. (B) Category of multiplier represented over time, in both policies and projects.
Categories I–V = as discussed in the main text (see Table 1), category 0 = no category specified.
Next, we consider whether additional gaps remain, in
theory, for appropriately sizing multipliers. Since techni-
cal considerations have been covered in detail (Moilanen
et al. 2009; Overton et al. 2012; Pickett et al. 2013; Laitila
et al. 2014), this section is structured around the other
categories proposed by Maron et al. (2016): social, eth-
ical, and governance considerations. To emphasize, our
intention is to highlight remaining gaps in the theoret-
ical specification of multipliers, so technical multipliers
already proposed in the literature for ecological reasons
would need to be combined with those we propose below
in seeking NNL.
Social considerations
In this subsection, we constrain our discussion to basic
in-kind exchanges of losses and gains in NNL biodiversity
trades. There are multiple possible categories of flexibility
in NNL trades that constitute out-of-kind exchanges (Bull
et al. 2015), which would bring in additional social con-
siderations (e.g., changes in biodiversity tenure), which
we have insufficient space to consider here.
Multipliers account for time preferences (category
IV; Table 1), but not the degree to which people
demonstrate bounded rationality in decision-making.
Kahneman & Tversky (1979) provide a now established
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model for decision-making under uncertainty (prospect
theory). Experiments revealed that people tend to be risk-
averse, weighting losses higher than gains. Furthermore,
people tend to underweight probable outcomes in com-
parison with certain outcomes, and put almost no weight
on low probability outcomes. Note, risk and time prefer-
ences are intertwined (Andersen et al. 2008; Andreoni &
Sprenger 2012) – the present is known, while the future
is inherently risky. This is problematic when studying
time preferences, since uncontrolled risk can generate be-
haviour biased toward the present (Andreoni & Sprenger
2012). Joint elicitation of risk and time preferences pro-
vides estimates of discount rates significantly lower than
normal (Andersen et al. 2008).
Human risk aversion is relevant to biodiversity
conservation (Hummel et al. 2009), especially where
stakeholders are expected to accept losses of existing
biodiversity in return for gains elsewhere. Not only
do people place greater weight on losses as they are
more certain – losses also naturally “loom larger.”
Consequently, an NNL multiplier incorporating prospect
theory is justifiable. Hypothetical calculations based upon
arbitrary parameter values for illustration (Figure S2),
suggest a multiplier in the order of tens could reasonably
be required to overcome human risk aversion, which has
not previously been considered in NNL policy (Table 3).
The assertion that prospect theory generates multipliers
in the order of tens could partly explain the magnitude of
realized multipliers (Table 2; Figure 1), or why multipli-
ers <10.0 reflect “operational feasibility” (Gibbons et al.
2015). But if offsets are indeed being widely designed
based on social preferences, without incorporating multi-
pliers large enough to account for the academic literature
on technical multipliers, then true NNL is likely not being
achieved.
Ethical considerations
Ives & Bekessy (2015) explore ethical considerations for
NNL, particularly: (1) acceptance of an outcomes-based
ethical framework for nature conservation, rather than
an actions-based framework like other environmental
policies; (2) whether people assign multiple intrinsic val-
ues to nature that cannot be traded; and (3) whether NNL
policies legitimize biodiversity loss. In this subsection, we
do not suggest larger multipliers could resolve ethical
concerns over the fundamental validity of NNL policy –
rather, we explore whether different ethical framings of
NNL trades permit multipliers.
If it is deemed inappropriate to use an outcomes-based
framework or impossible to meaningfully exchange
intrinsic values – extreme cases of points (1) and (2),
respectively – then NNL trades are not ethically accept-
able under any circumstances. This situation effectively
represents an infinite multiplier, i.e., developers must ei-
ther avoid all impacts, or not undertake the development.
It is unrealistic to expect that all development impacts
could be avoided, yet preventing all development is
hardly desirable. Therefore, a more nuanced framework
is necessary. One potential approach lies in treating NNL
trades using the framework for conservation trade-offs
outlined by Daw et al. (2015). Those authors explain that
values underlying trades are either “sacred” (e.g., human
life) or “secular” (e.g., money). Trading secular values
is morally acceptable, representing routine trade-offs.
Trading between secular and sacred values is morally
incommensurable, resulting in “taboo” trade-offs. Trad-
ing different sacred values is less morally repugnant
and sometimes virtuous, resulting in “tragic” trade-offs.
Under NNL, perhaps different stakeholders perceive
biodiversity trades associated with development as falling
within different categories of trade-off, depending upon
the values they themselves assign to biodiversity compo-
nents, e.g., place-based values, intrinsic values (Figure 3).
From a utilitarian perspective, if nature had no intrin-
sic value or if only outcomes mattered, NNL trades rep-
resent a routine trade-off. Considering nature to have
intrinsic value, NNL trades result in a loss of biodiver-
sity in exchange for financial gains – an unacceptable
taboo trade-off. Alternatively, some might consider na-
ture to have intrinsic value, but perceive NNL as an ac-
ceptance of losses of nature in exchange for: (1) social
welfare gains through development, i.e., different sacred
values or (2) high-value nature conservation elsewhere –
that is, difficult but acceptable tragic trade-offs. Departing
from Daw et al., the loss of biodiversity with low conser-
vation value for high conservation value gains (i.e., “trad-
ing up”) might be seen as trading secular losses for sacred
gains, a more acceptable trade-off. NNL trades may affect
many stakeholders with differing perspectives on where
within this framework the trades sit.
Such a framework (Figure 3) could be used to dis-
cuss NNL multipliers alongside ethical considerations. For
routine trades, ethical concerns are low, and multipli-
ers can be derived based upon existing technical and so-
cial considerations. When secular values are traded up
for sacred values, a low multiplier might be considered
acceptable. Conversely, a taboo trade may result in the
aforementioned infinite multiplier, ensuring sacred val-
ues are not exchanged for purely secular values. Finally,
a tragic trade would be more complicated – as discussed
by Daw et al., the unavoidable loss of one sacred value in
exchange for gain in another (e.g., fundamental societal
needs provided by development) might be deemed ethi-
cally acceptable. Then, the form of such trades would de-
pend on societal “willingness to accept” (WTA) losses for
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Table 3 summary from this review of all potential types of driver for specifying additional multipliers in NNL trades, including the potential order of
magnitude of those multipliers, and examples of alternatives to using those multipliers
Consideration
Category
(Table 1) Rationale Description Order of magnitude
Example alternative to using
multipliers
Technical II Poor information or
predictive power
See Table 1 100 –102 More measurement, monitoring
and research
Technical III Risk of failure See Table 1 n/a Diversification of compensation
strategies
Technical V Imperfect exchange
currencies
See Table 1 n/a Better technical design, more
research
Social I Broader biodiversity
objectives
See Table 1 101 Complementary policies
Social IV Temporal issues See Table 1 100 –102 Biodiversity banking
Social – Prospect theory Human risk aversion 101 a Biodiversity banking
Ethical – Trade-offs Routine trade-offs =1 n/a
Ethical – Trade-offs Taboo trade-offs (“trading
down”)
= Avoidance of impacts
Ethical – Trade-offs Taboo trade-offs (“trading
up”)
=1 Avoidance of impacts (and
forgone conservation benefit)
Ethical – Trade-offs Tragic trade-offs >1 (proportional to WTA/WTP) Avoidance of impacts
Ethical – Utilitarianism Removing ethical barriers
to environmental
destruction
n/a [None – challenges the very
validity of NNL policies]
Governance – Agency problems Power imbalance 100–102 (Dictator Game) Independent assessment; public
scrutiny
Governance – Trust fund models Lack of transparency; poor
accounting
n/a Independent assessment; public
scrutiny; accounting systems
Governance – Monitoring and
evaluation
Insufficient resources,
political will, or
guidelines
n/a Independent assessment; public
scrutiny; better guidelines for
monitoring outcomes
Governance – Leakage Spatial displacement of
development activity
101 Diversification of compensation
strategies
aHypothetical (see Figure S.2).
gains. Any such assessment of trading losses and gains in
biodiversity value would relate to reference points, like
trades under normative economics: the WTA compen-
sation for, in this case, environmental degradation; and,
the willingness to pay (WTP) for improving environmen-
tal conditions or avoiding degradation (Pearce & Moran
1994; Tilman 2000). Tragic NNL trade-offs can be framed
as a public WTA biodiversity loss, with compensation de-
termined by developer WTP. WTA is asymmetric with
WTP, so an additional multiplier potentially arises from
the ratio of the two, increasing when substitution possi-
bilities are smaller (Hanemann 1991; Shogren et al. 1994;
Table 3).
The third ethical issue raised by Ives & Bekessy (2015)
is whether the framing of NNL policies could make bio-
diversity loss more legitimate. A key concern here would
be whether requiring lower multipliers sends a signal to
stakeholders that biodiversity is more expendable, and
the opposite for higher multipliers – until the multiplier
is very high or infinite, at which point the signal is that
any biodiversity loss is unacceptable. This valid concern
must be taken into account when designing minimum
multipliers for NNL.
Governance considerations
Governance considerations have been discussed at length
in NNL literature. Challenges include: asymmetric access
to information; uneven sharing of risks between develop-
ers and other parties (Salzman & Ruhl 2000); conserva-
tion interests not overcoming political motivations to re-
lax environmental safeguards; market mechanisms being
vulnerable to institutional dynamics (Walker et al. 2009);
NNL policies having short lifespans (Bull et al. 2013); lack
of will or resources to evaluate NNL projects (Brown et al.
2014); perverse incentives to reduce conservation volun-
teerism (Gordon et al. 2015); leakage (Moilanen & Laitila
2016); lack of compliance; overestimation of gains; and,
cost-shifting (Maron et al. 2016). Our data corroborate
concerns regarding lack of transparency, monitoring, and
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Figure 3 Different ethical perspectives on NNL trades, depending upon whether losses and gains are seen as secular or sacred. Framework modified
from Daw et al. (2015).
evaluation of NNL – given the paucity of information
available on multiplier use (Table 2) – a broader problem
for NNL policies (Bull et al. 2013).
Overcoming governance challenges could involve
increased independent assessment, public scrutiny, and
more concrete guidelines for implementation (Walker
et al. 2009; Maron et al. 2016; Table 3). But no governance
considerations have been incorporated into multipliers,
except perhaps leakage (Moilanen & Laitila 2016). Since
weak governance would likely be associated with a
high chance of offset failure, simply increasing multi-
pliers would not ensure NNL, as for category III drivers
(Table 1; Pilgrim & Ekstrom 2014). In such cases, again,
diversification is a more appropriate strategy for reducing
risk. However, a multiplier could feasibly be used to
address any power imbalance between development and
conservation interests.
To explain, implementing NNL in practice involves
negotiation between parties: landowners, developers,
conservation agencies, local government. The Dictator
Game captures behaviour in such negotiations – an
established experiment in which party A (the “dictator”)
is given money to distribute between itself and party B.
Party B has no power over A, although A experiences
social pressure. Research shows A gives on average 28.35
% of the money to B – more than might be expected
given B’s lack of power, but less than the 50% which
might be deemed “fair” (Engel 2011). This game is
analogous to a developer implementing a biodiversity
offset, the size of which is to be determined through
negotiation with conservationists. If the developer holds
greater negotiation power and could therefore be treated
as the “dictator,” they may be able to negotiate down the
compensation required by NNL policy (from 100% of
necessary compensation, to as low a value as conserva-
tionists accept). Such an effect would be consistent with
our multiplier data, i.e., realized multipliers are lower
than proposed multipliers, and at the low end of the spec-
trum proposed by policy (Table 2). So, the proportional
power differential between different parties involved
in negotiating an NNL trade, derived via the Dictator
Game, could feasibly be used to calculate an additional
multiplier for compensation requirements, assuming that
compensation measures would eventually be negotiated
down to the amount required for true NNL (Table 3). Un-
derstanding the negotiation process for real NNL trades
(through theory such as the Dictator Game) is an impor-
tant topic in its own right, and relatively unexplored.
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Policy recommendations
It is clear from the literature that multipliers are a neces-
sary consideration for meaningful NNL trades. We have
shown that multipliers required to achieve NNL could be
larger than previously thought – by building upon the
existing technical literature and incorporating important
social, ethical, and governance considerations. But our
data analyses also show that multipliers are often not ex-
plicitly specified in NNL policy, or by individual projects,
and that those implemented are generally substantially
smaller than theory dictates. Consequently, there is an
implementation gap between the theory and practice of
multipliers implemented through NNL policy.
A prerequisite for making detailed policy recommen-
dations is better understanding of why this implemen-
tation gap exists. It is necessary to establish whether,
for instance: project developers do not implement larger
multipliers due to practical constraints; or, whether they
choose methods other than multipliers; or whether those
designing NNL measures are not sufficiently empowered
to ensure robust measures are put in place; or whether
the theory of NNL simply has to “catch up” with the prac-
tice (NNL policies have existed for 40 years, but the
first detailed article on multiplier design was published
recently; Moilanen et al. 2009). Further research is nec-
essary to provide clarity, particularly in relation to the
compensation negotiation process.
In the absence of evidence to explain the implementa-
tion gap between theory and practice of multipliers, we
recommend that: first, every NNL policy should incorpo-
rate detailed guidelines on multiplier design and use. Sec-
ond, policymakers should endeavor to incorporate theo-
retical research on NNL into policy, requiring developers
to implement much larger multipliers than is currently
the norm. This could be supported through institutional
safeguards that protect against power imbalances during
negotiations. However, it would be insufficient for policy-
makers to stop there, as multipliers may be insufficient in
isolation to secure NNL. So, policymakers should also of-
fer developers guidelines on additional, complementary
approaches they can take to meeting the NNL require-
ments otherwise covered by multipliers – some of which
we capture in Table 3. For instance, a multiplier in the
order of tens might be implemented to manage ecological
uncertainties, alongside: biodiversity banking that deliv-
ers gains in advance of losses (instead of temporal mul-
tipliers); increased investment in avoidance of impacts
(reducing predicted losses and therefore necessary multi-
plier size); additional compensation measures (i.e., using
diversification to account for possible restoration failure,
rather than multipliers); and opening biodiversity com-
pensation calculations up to public scrutiny (to reassure
stakeholders that, e.g., governance-related multipliers are
unnecessary).
In this way, gaps between multiplier values suggested
by theory and those realized in practice could be ac-
counted for. That is not to say developers should be
enabled to avoid implementing large multipliers – rather,
that alternative options (such as those mentioned in
Table 3) must be implemented to manage any of the
challenges reviewed in this article that are not managed
through a multiplier. The signal is not that small multi-
pliers are acceptable – rather, that true NNL necessitates
large multipliers, to the extent that project proponents
must likely also find accompanying alternative measures.
We recognize that the latter assertion is contingent on
ensuring developers demonstrably and transparently im-
plement the necessary measures alongside multipliers in
achieving NNL. That brings us to the final requirement:
policy must encapsulate the need for reporting on the
design and implementation of multipliers, enabling main-
tenance of transparent records of NNL accounting for all
projects. The need for transparent regional, national, and
international databases containing details concerning the
implementation of NNL policy has been highlighted in
the literature (Bull et al. 2013), but has yet to be met.
But again, we emphasize that more definitive recom-
mendations will only be possible once further research
is completed into this topic. That research is required to
examine why multipliers are consistently low in practice
(Table 2). In turn, this would enable us to determine
whether requiring higher multipliers from NNL projects
is overly optimistic or even unrealistic, and whether not
requiring higher multipliers would send the wrong sig-
nal to developers. In summary, does the implementation
gap we have identified arise from gaps in the theory or
the practice of NNL? If the latter, we may need higher
multipliers (raising the bar in practice so as to meet the-
oretical requirements) – if the former, we may need to
focus upon implementing additional mitigation strategies
as well as simply increasing the size of multipliers. Both
are potential routes to achieving true NNL, but we recog-
nize that determining which is the most appropriate is at
least partly a political decision, and therefore beyond the
remit of conservation science.
On a final note, biodiversity trades under NNL pol-
icy should be better framed in relation to ethical con-
siderations. Some can reconcilably be incorporated into
NNL calculations, others cannot. We recommend that,
for any project, biodiversity losses and gains are cat-
egorized as “secular” or “sacred” values (or similar)
based upon stakeholder consultation. Doing so would
not be overly complicated for developers, as it is not
too dissimilar from existing approaches to Environmen-
tal and Social Impact Assessment, which often lays the
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groundwork for NNL strategies. Furthermore, there is an
incentive for developers to understand stakeholder per-
ceptions, as these greatly influence the amount of re-
sistance a project might receive – see, for instance, the
Trans-Mountain Pipeline (Bull & Sandom 2016). Under
such categories, NNL trades can be modified based on
consideration of taboo trade-offs and public WTA losses
(Figure 3; Table 3). Ultimately, social and ethical consid-
erations are likely just as important to successful imple-
mentation of NNL policy as technical considerations, if
not more so.
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